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T
hree years ago at this same conference, I was given an oppor-
tunity to talk about Japan’s monetary policy in the years when
asset price bubbles expanded.1 Today, I would like mainly to
review monetary policy in the following phase when the bubbles
burst, for an asset price swing is the “changing economic environ-
ment” most relevant to us. Incidentally, we are now in the third phase
when the economy is in a “liquidity trap,” which I will leave for a
future topic of discussion. 
I have to start with a bit of an old story. The Tokyo stock market
peaked in late 1989. The bubble in the property market—and in Japan
real estate had far greater market capitalization relative to stocks—per-
sisted about a year longer. A growth slowdown followed. The trend
growth rate in the 1990s is just 1 percent per year on average, a marked
shift downward from 4 percent in the 1980s (Chart 1). 
There is little doubt that the bursting of asset price bubbles con-
tributed significantly to the decline in the trend growth rate. But it was
not the sole reason. Against the backdrop of a changing environment,
such as a rapidly aging society and limited export-led growth, a prospec-
tive shift to more moderate growth was already broadly envisioned in the
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early 1980s. The economic system, which had been built on the premise
of high growth, needed to be modified and, in fact, was already in the
middle of significant structural adjustment in the mid-1980s. 
The asset price bubbles not merely interrupted this process but
turned the clock backward. The excessive optimism, the main feature of
a major asset bubble, induced businesses to build up capital stocks, pay-
rolls, and debts that would have made sense only under a sustained
acceleration of growth. When the bubbles burst, the ensuing adjust-
ment and workout had to be all the more painful and prolonged. 
This aspect of Japan’s asset market bubble, with its consequences for
the structural adjustment in the 1990s, is important because it illustrates
the specific environment in which the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had to
conduct monetary policy. In other words, monetary policy conducted in
a different context should be assessed in the light of each unique histori-
cal setting, and its effects should be different where, for instance, a need
is less evident for a structural shift to lower growth. 
Chart 1
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INFLATION
Note: Figures for the CPI are adjusted for the impacts of the consumption tax, which was intro-
duced at a rate of 3 percent in April 1989, and increased to 5 percent in April 1997.
Sources: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer
Price Index; Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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In July 1991, the BOJ started to cut the Official Discount Rate
(ODR), then at 6 percent. Those were the days when production and
the CPI showed signs of acceleration and substantial uncertainty existed
as to whether the business cycle had peaked. Re-emergence of a land
price bubble was a more convincing scenario than a sustained asset
deflation. Therefore, the ODR cut in mid-1991 received harsh criticism
in and outside the country as a premature relaxation. 
In retrospect, it turned out to be the first of a series of reductions,
and by September 1995 the ODR was as low as 0.5 percent—the
level some economists regard as a possible threshold to a liquidity
trap. In about a four-year span, the sizable room for interest rate
reduction had essentially been used up.
The BOJ has often been criticized for an alleged delay in monetary
easing. Significant research has been conducted, including studies by
the BOJ staff as well as by the Federal Reserve Board staff, to assess the
easing path by applying a standard backward-looking Taylor rule as cri-
teria.2 One such study concluded that monetary easing after the bubble
burst, particularly in the crucial early stage of relaxation, could be con-
sidered generally appropriate as a standard stabilization policy based on
real-time financial and economic indicators as well as market forecasts
(Chart 2). And yet, even with a policy response that could be consid-
ered appropriate in normal times, there emerged a substantial decline in
the trend growth rate as well as a rapid and continuous fall in asset
prices that weakened the financial system and destabilized the economy. 
Against the background of the post-bubble economic performance
of Japan, the views have been expressed that the bank should have gone
beyond standard stabilization policy and tried more aggressive easing
before monetary policy became constrained by the zero nominal bound.
Let me briefly examine two aspects of such views. The first is the
practical feasibility, which partly depends on the predictability on a real-
time basis of a post-bubble economic trend. The second is the
effectiveness of an aggressive monetary policy to mitigate the adverse
effects stemming from the bursting of asset price bubbles. 
Suppose a central bank decides to ease dramatically beyond “stan-
dard” or rule-based guidelines at an early stage. The intention would be
to pre-emptively accelerate inflation to avoid the future risk of deflation
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sharply, economic growth is still fairly robust, and inflation is mild. The
accelerated inflation rate required to offset the negative shock generated
by the bursting asset bubbles should well-exceed the target if the
country in question is pursuing an inflation-targeting policy.
The central bank pursuing such a strategy would have to be acutely
concerned, substantiated by quantitative analyses, about the risk of
deflation a few years into the future. Without such a superb insight, it
would be hardly possible for a central bank to abandon a price target,
explicit or implicit, at a stage when deflation is yet a remote risk.
Economic predictions are inevitably clouded by uncertainties. What
makes economic reading in the post-bubble period uniquely difficult is
the great uncertainties associated with asset market developments.
Chart 2
TAYLOR RULE
Notes: 1. Taylor rule is defined as follows: 
Basic equation: Rt = r*t+π *+α (π t–π *)+β (Yt–Y*)
r*t:  Equilibrium real short-term interest rate at period t
π *:  Targeted rate of inflation
Rt:  Uncollateralized overnight call rate at period t
π t: Rate of CPI inflation at period t
Yt–Y*: Output gap at period t
where α and β are equal to 1.5 and 0.5, respectively.
2. Target rate based on Taylor rule, shown in bold line, is adjusted for the introduction of the con-
sumption tax (3 percent) in April 1989, and an increase in its rate (to 5 percent) in April 1997. For
reference, the consumption tax non-adjusted series is also plotted as the shaded line.
Sources: Kunio Okiina and Shigenori Shiratsuka, “Asset Price Bubbles, Price Stability, and Monetary
Policy: Japan’s Experience,” IMES Discussion Paper 2001-E-16, Institute for Monetary and Eco-
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First, we cannot be sure how the asset markets will develop and
when an equilibrium with the real economy will be restored. In addi-
tion, different asset segments can show divergent price patterns, as in
Japan’s stock and real estate markets in 1990. Such divergence can
emerge at an early stage when inertia of wishful thinking lingers with
the confusing effects on expectations. Thus, the capital loss and the
harm to the financial health of businesses and households are extremely
difficult to estimate.
Second, uncertainty also exists in the transmission mechanism
between asset prices and real activity and inflation. In an economy like
Japan’s, where banks dominate financial intermediation, capital losses
tend to accumulate gradually in the banking system (Table 1). Indeed,
there was a presumption that shocks would be contained within the
financial sector and would not spread to the real side of the economy.
Table 1
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
[1] Financial liabilities held by nonfinancial corporations (ratio to total financial liabilities)
Percents
Japan U.S. Germany
Borrowing 38.8 12.1 33.3
Bonds 9.3 8.2 1.3
Shares and equities 33.8 66.6 54.3
Others 18.1 13.0 11.0
[2] Financial assets held by households (ratio to total financial assets)
Japan U.S. Germany
Currency and deposits 54.0 9.6 35.2
Bonds 5.3 9.5 10.1
Investment trusts 2.3 10.9 10.5
Shares and equities 8.1 37.3 16.8
Insurance and pension 26.4 30.5 26.4
Others 3.9 2.2 1.1
Notes: [1] Figures are those for the end of 1999. [2] Regarding financial debt for enterprises, stocks
are evaluated at market value, and, thus, do not necessarily correspond to the accumulated funding by
enterprises. It should be noted that equities are likely to be higher for the U.S., compared to those for
other countries, because net worth of sole proprietorships are included as households’ equities.
Source: Bank of Japan, Research and Statistics Department, “Japan’s Financial Structure: In View of
the Flow of Funds Accounts,” Quarterly Bulletin, 9(1), Public Relations Department, Bank of
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Chart 3
SIMULATION OF HYPOTHETICAL EARLY 
MONETARY EASING
* Adjusted for estimated effect of consumption tax increase in 1997q2.
† Short-term nominal rate minus consumer price inflation over the previous four quarters.
Source: Alan Aherne, and others. “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the



































































Baseline (actual historical path)
250 basis point exogenous fall in nominal interest rate in 1991q1
250 basis point exogenous fall in nominal interest rate in 1994q1
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Therefore, there was a widespread belief that the situation would turn
around if business could be sustained until land prices started to rise
again. When bank capital was eroded to a critical threshold, however,
an acute credit crunch erupted. It is against such an uncertain setting
that economic forecasting must incorporate the timing and magnitude
of the “headwind” generated by the deteriorating balance-sheet condi-
tions of businesses, households, and particularly banks. 
Let me turn to the second aspect—namely, the effectiveness of a
hypothetical early easing. Some simulation results indicate that such a
policy would have elevated the inflation rate to a level that would have
worked as a comfortable cushion against future deflation (Chart 3).
An important point here is what lies at the root of the predicament
of Japan’s economy and financial system. Admittedly, under the non-
negativity constraint of nominal interest rates, real rates will be pushed
up by the extent of deflation, even though deflation itself is rather
limited at less than 1 percent per year in Japan now. However, as sug-
gested by Chart 4, asset price deflation, which has been continuous for
ten years at an annual rate of close to 10 percent, has likely exerted far
greater pressure on activity than slightly positive real interest rates. 
Chart 4
ASSET PRICE DEFLATION
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly, Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer Price Index; Japan Real Estate Institute,
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The question from my perspective is: Could aggressive easing have
significantly moderated the fall of real estate prices and, therefore, the
balance-sheet problem? Generally speaking, significantly lower interest
rates should be conducive to a tighter output gap, higher inflation, and,
when the asset market is falling, a moderate asset price decline. Would
such results be achieved by aggressive easing in the aftermath of an asset
bubble? I am skeptical. 
We have witnessed time and again that after asset inflation has
developed into a major bubble, it is impossible to “soft land” the
market. That being the case, and if the asset market in question has tra-
ditionally served as a sort of anchor for financial stability, as with real
estate in Japan, the capacity of monetary policy to stimulate demand
and inflation is bound to be severely impaired. Even if such a strategy
had proved to be successful, it would only have delayed the inevitable
adjustment between asset prices and economic fundamentals.
If a central bank’s predicting ability of post-bubble developments
has to remain less than perfect, would it be better once again to con-
sider aggressive tightening when a bubble is perceived to be growing?
This is the question I talked about three years ago here. I remain skep-
tical. However, given the fact that it is always the preceding massive
flows of credit that become worthless once the tide is reversed, severely
damaging the balance sheets of the parties concerned, it might be worth
considering possible ways to focus on restraining “excessive” credit flows
during asset market upswings (Chart 5). 
Let me conclude by adding a few observations in somewhat
broader context. It is ironic that, as the track record shows (Chart 1,
Chart 2), the Bank of Japan followed a path in the 1980s and early
1990s that could be regarded as fully consistent with some policy rule,
such as the Taylor rule, and yet suffered from the wildest swings of asset
markets. Suggestions have been made that the bank should have devi-
ated from such an implicit rule-based path, both in times of upswing as
well as downswing. From my perspective, for discussions on policy rules
to be more relevant and robust, they should at least take into account
major swings of asset prices. Our experience shows that price stability,
by making low interest rates possible, can pave the way to a major asset
price bubble when it is coupled with excessive optimism for the future.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 77
Finally, what matters most in the post-bubble development is the
magnitude of the lost capital and its distribution (that is, who in the
system has to absorb the loss). In Japan, that magnitude has been over-
whelming and has been concentrated in the banking sector. 
When an economy is faced with the size of lost capital, as in Japan,
a well-functioning financial infrastructure is crucially important for its
prompt resolution. Infrastructure in this context includes proper
accounting, disclosure, disciplined governance, an incentive mecha-
nism, and supervision. Japan was slow in developing and putting into
place such a framework. 
I emphasize this aspect because if expeditious and forceful progress
had been made to deal with the capital loss in general and that of the
banking system in particular, monetary policy in Japan might have
found a different environment in which to operate. Amid a major
shock, such as the collapse of key asset prices, a need to address the
nexus of monetary and prudential policies cannot be overemphasized.
Chart 5
CREDITS AND ASSET PRICES IN JAPAN
Note: Real aggregate asset price indices are a weighted average of equity and residential and commer-
cial estate price indices deflated by consumer prices. The weights are based on the composition of
private sector wealth.
Source: Bank of International Settlements, Quarterly Review, International Banking and Financial
Market Developments, August 1999.
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